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The word dharma is used in a variety of meanings. In philosophical parlance it is mainly 
used in two totally different ways, which one might call the Buddhist and the Brahmanical 
way. This article will briefly present the way in which the Buddhists came to use the term 
(usually in the plural), then sketch the development which the Brahmanical concept of 
dharma (singular) underwent in the hands of the adherents of the Vaiße∑ika philosophy. 
 
With regard to Buddhism we can be brief.1 The word dharma here came to be used for the 
items collected in lists in what is known by the name Abhidharma. These lists may 
originally have contained no more than items considered important to be memorized, often 
mental states. For our present purposes all that counts is that when at last one of the 
Buddhist schools decided to put order into the inherited teachings, it promoted the items 
thus collected, the dharmas, to the status of being the ultimate, and only, constituents of all 
that exists. 
 This revision, which amounted to a philosophical revolution, apparently took place 
in the north-west of the Indian subcontinent, at some time during the centuries preceding 
the common era, and the outcome was primarily preserved in the texts of the Sarvåstivåda 
school of Abhidharma. This intellectual revolution did more than just turn dharmas into 
elements of existence. It imposed a thoroughly atomistic vision on common sense reality, 
thus reducing the latter to non-existence. All complex entities — which includes virtually 
everything that we are familiar with from experience — were stated to be non-existent, 
precisely because they were nothing beyond their constituent elements. The impetus to this 
radical rejection of common sense reality must have come from the Buddhist doctrine 
according to which no person exists. What we believe is a person is made up of numerous 
mental and physical states, precisely the things known as dharmas.2 That is to say, the 
person does not exist, but the elements that constitute it do. Or more explicitly: the person 
                                                
1 The section on Buddhist dharmas heavily draws upon Bronkhorst, 2000. 
2 Cp. Gethin's understanding of dharma as “an instance of one of the fundamental physical or mental events 
that interact to produce the world as we experience it” (Wijeratne and Gethin, 2002: xix). 
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does not exist because it is complex; its ultimate constituent elements on the other hand do 
exist. The same reasoning was applied to other things that have constituent elements. 
 It will be clear that this kind of logic inevitably leads to the conclusion that only 
dharmas exist, and that these dharmas cannot themselves harbour constitutive elements. 
That is to say, the dharmas are irreducible and are for that reason the ultimate constituents 
of the things that make up phenomenal reality. Strictly speaking the dharmas are the only 
things that exist, for the objects of phenomenal reality, being made up of more elementary 
constituents, do not. 
 Seen in this way, the ontological position of the Buddhist dharmas can easily be 
defined: they are the only things that really exist. The Sarvåstivådins had more to say about 
their dharmas, to be sure. Their thoroughly atomistic approach led them to another 
postulate: the dharmas are momentary. They also made an effort to enumerate all dharmas 
in an exhaustive list and to categorize them. They went to the extent of deviating from 
traditional forms of categorization and introducing a new system, called Pañcavastuka, 
which far more comprehensively summarized all the dharmas in five categories.3 Nor did 
they hesitate to introduce newly invented dharmas which they felt were required to arrive at 
a coherent vision of the world. All this led them into sometimes frighteningly complex 
arguments, which have the unfortunate tendency of obscuring from view the overall vision 
that is hidden behind it. 
 This particular understanding of the dharmas as elements of existence, the only 
things that really exist, characterizes later developments in Buddhist thought, even in 
philosophical developments (such as the Madhyamaka philosophy) that came to reject the 
existence of the dharmas. The position of these latter, called dharmanairåtmya ‘non-reality 
of the dharmas’, amounts to a radical denial of all that exists, a position in which even the 
last remaining anchors in reality, i.e. the dharmas, are removed. In an important way the 
denial of the dharmas was a continuation of the original denial of empirical reality that 
characterized the postulation of dharmas as the only existing entities. The denial of 
composite objects and personalities justified, all by itself, statements of the kind that no 
Buddha exists or has ever existed, which we find, for example, in the Buddhist 
Prajñåpåramitå literature. Denying the existence of the dharmas hardly sounds radical in a 
Buddhism that has already denied the existence of its founder. 
 
                                                
3 See Frauwallner, 1963/1995. 
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Within the Brahmanical philosophies the word dharma is not used as in Buddhism. 
Fundamentally dharma is here something like ‘merit’. As such there is nothing noteworthy 
in the concept of dharma in the Brahmanical philosophical systems. Some of these — first 
of all the Vaiße∑ika — tried to specify the concept. This led to the developments which will 
be outlined here. 
 Dharma occupies a prominent position in the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. This text begins with 
the announcement that dharma will be explained (athåto dharmaµ vyåkhyåsyåma˙). This 
suggests that dharma plays a fundamental role in this school of thought. However, when we 
consider this philosophy in its classical form, we find that dharma is not so fundamental 
after all. 
 The classical doctrine of Vaiße∑ika finds expression in Praßasta's 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha, also known by the name Praßastapådabhå∑ya. This text divides 
all that exists into six categories, called ‘substance’ (dravya), ‘quality’ (guˆa), ‘activity’ 
(karman), ‘universal’ (såmånya), ‘specificity’ (viße∑a) and ‘inherence’ (samavåya) 
respectively. It states that knowledge of the essence of these categories, through the 
similarities and differences between them, is the cause of the highest good.4 Dharma and its 
opposite and companion adharma are classified among the qualities; they are qualities that 
can only reside in a single substance, ‘soul’ (åtman), not in other substances. 
 Dharma and adharma are not the only qualities that can reside only in the soul. The 
text provides a complete list of such qualities: knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain 
(du˙kha), desire (icchå), repulsion (dve∑a), effort (prayatna), dharma and adharma;5 
subliminal impressions (saµskåra) might be included in this list, even though other aspects 
of saµskåra allow it to reside in other substances as well. Together, these qualities of the 
soul account for the psychological functioning of a person. Knowledge, which is 
experience, causes pleasure or pain; these give rise to desire and repulsion, respectively. 
Desire and repulsion bring about effort (prayatna), which in its turn brings about bodily 
activities aiming to reestablish or avoid the sources of pleasure and pain, respectively. This 
leads to new experiences, etc. etc. A further effect of these activities is the production of 
dharma and adharma, which determine one's future state. Correct knowledge, which is 
primarily knowledge of the Vaiße∑ika philosophy, will free a person from passion, as a 
result of which in the end no more dharma and adharma will be produced and liberation 
                                                
4 The passage (WI p. 1 § 2) is cited below. 
5 WI p. 16 § 80: tasya (= åtmana˙) guˆå˙ 
buddhisukhadu˙khecchådve∑aprayatnadharmådharmasaµskårasaµkhyåparimåˆap®thaktvasaµyogavibhågå˙. 
The remaining qualities of this list can also occur in other substances. 
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from rebirth will be obtained.6 Dharma and adharma obviously play some kind of 
intermediary role in all this. Dharma in particular can help a person some way in the 
direction of final liberation, but not all the way, for all the remaining dharma has to be 
consumed before liberation can take place. That is to say: the soul quality called dharma is 
an important causal factor with respect to liberation,7 but it would not be justified to say 
that dharma, or knowledge of dharma, brings it about. Yet this is what the Vaiße∑ika SËtra 
appears to say, as we will see below. For the Padårthadharmasa∫graha, as we have seen, the 
cause of the highest good, i.e. of liberation, is knowledge of the Vaiße∑ika categories. It is 
true that this knowledge has to follow a number of preparatory conditions, which are 
described in some detail in the text; this does not change the fact that the clinching element 
is knowledge. 
 There is one passage in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha which appears to use the word 
dharma in a way that differs from its classical usage. This passage reads:8 
 
(1) dravyaguˆakarmasåmånyaviße∑asamavåyånåµ ∑aˆˆåµ padårthånåµ 
sådharmyavaidharmyåbhyåµ tattvajñånaµ ni˙ßreyasahetu˙ / tac 
ceßvaracodanåbhivyaktåd dharmåd eva / (WI p. 1 § 2) 
 “Knowledge of the essence of the six categories — viz. substance (dravya), quality 
(guˆa), activity (karman), universal (såmånya), specificity (viße∑a) and inherence 
(samavåya) —, by way of the similarity and dissimilarity [between them], is the 
cause of the highest good. That [knowledge comes about] as a result of dharma that 
is manifested through the injunctions of the Lord.” 
 
The last part of this passage is not free from difficulties. If we assume that here, too, 
dharma designates the quality of the soul described above, how then are we supposed to 
understand that liberating knowledge can only result from dharma which is manifested 
through the injunctions of the Lord? What could it mean that this specific quality of the 
soul is manifested through the injunctions of the Lord? Does God utter injunctions to the 
effect that dharma that is already present in a soul must manifest itself? The 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha contains no hint suggesting that any such manifestations of 
dharma ever take place. And the early commentators do not provide help either. 
                                                
6 Bronkhorst, 2000a: § 4, § 6. 
7 Cp. WI p. 63 § 308: kartu˙ priyahitamok∑ahetu˙ [dharma˙]. 
8 Some editions omit ∑aˆˆåµ, others read sådharmyavaidharmyatattvajñånaµ; some again have °nodanå° for 
°codanå°. 
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 There is however an obvious answer to these questions, if only we are willing to 
look outside the Vaiße∑ika system. M¥måµså-sËtra 1.1.2 defines dharma as follows: 
codanålak∑aˆo 'rtho dharma˙. Frauwallner (1968: 17) translates this: “Der Dharma˙ ist 
etwas Nützliches, dessen Kennzeichen die (vedischen) Weisungen sind.” In other words: 
dharma is characterized by codanå in the M¥måµså SËtra, just as it is manifested by codanå 
in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. This strongly suggests that Praßasta here uses the term 
dharma as it was used in M¥måµså, and not as he uses it everywhere else in his 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha. That is to say, dharma in this passage of the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha does not refer to the classical Vaiße∑ika idea of dharma, a quality 
of the soul, but to the M¥måµså idea of dharma. It is true that Praßasta adds one word to 
mark his difference from the M¥måµså position. He prefixes the word ¥ßvara ‘God’ to 
codanå, thus indicating that he, unlike the M¥måµsakas, looks upon Vedic injunctions as 
coming from God. This by itself is not surprising, because Praßasta appears to have been 
one of the first, if not the first, to introduce the notion of a creator God into the Vaiße∑ika 
system.9 
 This different use of the term dharma in one single passage of the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha suggests that the new Vaiße∑ika understanding of dharma as a 
quality of the soul replaced an earlier one, within the Vaiße∑ika school itself, that was close 
to, or identical with, the M¥måµså idea of dharma. The present passage would then 
preserve a trace of this earlier usage. 
 Various considerations confirm the view that the classical Vaiße∑ika understanding 
of dharma as a quality of the soul represents a change of doctrine within the school that had 
taken place at some time before Praßasta but after its earliest beginnings. Consider the 
following: 
(a) The way in which the Padårthadharmasa∫graha presents the qualities, and dharma in 
particular, allows us to conclude that much had changed between the time of the Vaiße∑ika 
SËtra (since the surviving text has undergone various modifications, the expression “time of 
the Vaiße∑ika SËtra” is imprecise) and that of Praßasta. The Padårthadharmasa∫graha 
initially cites Vaiße∑ika-sËtra 1.1.5, which enumerates seventeen qualities.10 Dharma and 
adharma do not figure among these. The Padårthadharmasa∫graha then adds seven more 
                                                
9 Bronkhorst, 1996. 
10 WI p. 1 § 5: guˆåß ca 
rËparasagandhasparßasaµkhyåparimåˆap®thaktvasaµyogavibhågaparatvåparatvabuddhisukhadu˙khecchådve∑
aprayatnåß ceti kaˆ†hoktå˙ saptadaßa. (Some editions omit the first ca, one omits °saµkhyå°, another one iti.) 
Compare this with VS(C) 1.1.5: rËparasagandhasparßå˙ sa∫khyå˙ parimåˆåni p®thaktvaµ saµyogavibhågau 
paratvåparatve buddhaya˙ sukhadu˙khe icchådve∑au prayatnaß ca guˆå˙. 
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qualities (which cover dharma and adharma, see below), which it claims are covered in the 
sËtra by the particle ca. It seems safe to conclude that the Vaiße∑ika SËtra known to Praßasta 
did not yet include dharma among the qualities. The same is true of all its surviving 
versions. 
(b) The Padårthadharmasa∫graha says that it enumerates seven additional qualities, but 
in fact it enumerates only six items: heaviness (gurutva), fluidity (dravatva), viscosity 
(sneha), saµskåra (no single translation is possible; see Kapani, 1992-1993: I: 277 ff.), “the 
unseen” (ad®∑†a) and sound (ßabda).11 The solution to this riddle lies in the fact that the 
single item ad®∑†a stands for the two qualities dharma and adharma, as is clear from other 
passages in the same book: the enumeration of qualities of the soul, for example, does 
include dharma and adharma rather than ad®∑†a,12 and dharma and adharma are sometimes 
used to refer back to ad®∑†a.13 Ad®∑†a is a term that occurs a number of times in the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra, primarily in the fifth chapter, most often to explain physical processes: 
“ad®∑†a moves objects in ordeals and magnetic processes; it causes extraordinary 
movements of earth and water, the circulation of water in trees, the upward flaming of fire, 
the horizontal blowing of wind or air, the initial movements of atoms and ‘minds’ (manas, 
in the process of forming new organisms)” (Halbfass, 1991: 311). Halbfass (1991: 312 f.) 
further points out that the Vaiße∑ika SËtra nowhere states that ad®∑†a and dharma/adharma 
are identical, nor that they are different. He draws attention to the fact that the Nyåya 
Bhå∑ya of Våtsyåyana knows dharma and adharma as being inherent in the soul, but does 
not use the term ad®∑†a as a synonym for these two. This term is here rather used with 
reference to a theory that is rejected and that maintains that there is ad®∑†a in the material 
atoms (aˆu), as well as in the ‘mind’ (manas),14 and that gives them the kinetic impulse 
needed for the formation of bodies and so on. Also the commentator Vyomaßiva on the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha is acquainted with, and rejects, the theory that ad®∑†a resides in 
atoms and not in the soul. Halbfass (1991: 315) assumes that ad®∑†a “may primarily have 
                                                
11 WI p. 1-2 § 5: caßabdasamuccitåß ca gurutvadravatvasnehasaµskåråd®∑†aßabdå˙ saptaivety caturviµßatir 
guˆå˙. (Variants: one edition reads tu for ca, one omits saptaiva and reads eva for evaµ, some read 
caturviµßatiguˆå˙.) 
12 See note 3, above. 
13 E. g. WI p. 43 § 228: ... ad®∑†åc ca; § 231: ... tat sarvaµ saµskåradharmåbhyåµ bhavati / ... tat sarvam 
adharmasaµskåråbhyåµ bhavati /  
14 The M¥måµsåko∑a (IV p. 2241) cites a passage from Prabhåkara's B®hat¥ according to which some 
consider dharma a quality of the buddhi, others a quality of the self (p. 26: dharmaµ kecit buddhiguˆaµ 
manyante kecit åtmaguˆam). On p. 2249 it cites a line from Pårthasårathi Mißra's Íåstrad¥pikå according to 
which dharma and adharma are fluctuations (?v®tti) of the internal organ (1.1.5.5, p. 114 l. 3: 
dharmådharmayo˙ anta˙karaˆav®ttitvåt). 
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been a gapfiller in the causal explication of the universe”.15 We may conclude that the 
classical notions of dharma and adharma as qualities of the soul absorbed the notion of 
ad®∑†a which was initially different from these two. 
 
It is clear from the above that the Vaiße∑ika SËtra as known to Praßasta, just like the 
versions known to us today, did not count dharma and adharma among the qualities. And 
yet dharma plays a central role in the first three sËtras of this text,16 which read as follows 
(for an interpretation, see below): 
 
(i) athåto dharmaµ vyåkhyåsyåma˙ 
(ii) yato 'bhyudayani˙ßreyasasiddhi˙ sa dharma˙ 
(iii) tadvacanåd åmnåyasya pråmåˆyam17 
 
SËtra (i) announces that dharma will be explained, presumably in the remainder of the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra; sËtra (ii) adds that on the basis of dharma one reaches abhyudaya and 
ni˙ßreyasa (to be understood as residence in Brahmaloka and liberation respectively, 
according to the commentator Candrånanda); while sËtra (iii) appears to state that the Veda 
is authoritative because it teaches dharma.18 The dharma taught by the Veda is not, of 
course, the quality of the soul accepted by later Vaiße∑ikas. It must be something very 
similar to the dharma which the M¥måµsakas believed was taught in the Veda. And indeed, 
if we assume that Praßasta's characterization of dharma as ¥ßvaracodanåbhivyakta 
‘manifested by the injunctions of the Lord’ continues an earlier Vaiße∑ika tradition, we can 
                                                
15 For at least some Buddhist thinkers acintya appears to have played a similar role; see Kritzer, 2002. 
16 VS 1.1.1-3. These sËtras figure in all surviving versions of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, i.e., the ones commented 
upon by Candrånanda, Bha††a Våd¥ndra and Ía∫kara Mißra respectively, as well as the two further recensions 
discovered and edited by Isaacson (1995: 216, 270). About the question whether originally a fourth sËtra, now 
only preserved in the version commented upon by Ía∫kara Mißra, concluded this set, see the appendix. 
17 VS(C) 1.1.3 has åmnåyapråmåˆyam. 
18 The expression tadvacanåt has been interpreted to mean: 
(i) because Hiraˆyagarbha has uttered it (Candrånanda) 
(ii) because it teaches svarga and apavarga (Bha††a Våd¥ndra) 
(iii) because God has uttered it (Bha††a Våd¥ndra, Ía∫kara Mißra) 
(iv) because it teaches dharma (Bha††a Våd¥ndra, Ía∫kara Mißra) 
(v) because it teaches the self (Bha††a Våd¥ndra) 
There can hardly be any doubt that (iv) is by far the most natural understanding of this expression in its 
context. It leads to the following interpretation of the sËtra: “The Veda is authoritative because it teaches 
dharma.” 
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conclude that early Vaiße∑ika shared in most essential respects its notion of dharma with 
ritual M¥måµså.19 
 This does not necessarily entail that all occurrences of the word dharma in the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra have to be interpreted as in M¥måµså. One should never forget that the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra is not the unitary composition of one single individual. Already before the 
time of Praßasta, this text had undergone numerous modifications. There is, for example, 
reason to think that sËtras had been added and that their original order had been changed.20 
It is not therefore impossible that the new meaning of dharma manifests itself already in 
some parts of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra as we know it. At some places (VS(C) 4.2.5: 
dharmaviße∑åt; 6.2.18: icchådve∑apËrvikå dharmådharmayo˙ prav®tti˙) one has indeed the 
impression that dharma, already in the surviving Vaiße∑ika SËtra, is used in its classical 
sense, referring to a quality of the soul. This merely suggests that the new meaning of 
dharma, its understanding as a quality of the soul, had been introduced into Vaiße∑ika 
already before Praßasta. Unfortunately no evidence is known to me that would allow us to 
determine with more precision exactly when this change may have taken place. 
 
How is the term dharma used in M¥måµså? We have already seen that dharma is 
“characterized by injunctions (codanå)” (M¥måµså-sËtra 1.1.2). Beyond this, the M¥måµså 
Bhå∑ya of Íabara, the classical text for this school of Vedic interpretation, says remarkably 
little about it. Indeed, while introducing sËtra 1.1.2 Íabara states that experts have varying 
opinions as to what is dharma.21 SËtra 1.1.2 (codanålak∑aˆo 'rtho dharma˙; see above) is 
meant to resolve this issue. Dharma is what one gets to know through Vedic revelation, 
which consists in injunctions. What do we learn through these injunctions? Primarily what 
activities — sacrificial activities — lead to heaven. The intermediary between a sacrifice 
and heaven (which is reached long after the termination of the sacrifice) is represented by 
the mysterious apËrva, which guarantees the connection between the two. Dharma, apËrva 
and codanå are closely connected, and in one passage Íabara states in so many words that 
one speaks about codanå to indicate apËrva.22 Elsewhere he identifies dharma with ‘the 
                                                
19 Thakur (1961: 3) suggests that dharma at the beginning of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra means padårthadharma, 
“‘property’ or ‘attribute’ of the different categories” (Houben, 1994: 732 n. 27). This seems unlikely. 
20 See Bronkhorst, 1993a; 1994. 
21 Frauwallner, 1968: 16: dharmaµ prati hi vipratipannå bahuvida˙ / kecid anyaµ dharmam åhu˙, kecid 
anyam / 
22 Íabara's Bhå∑ya on M¥måµså-sËtra 2.1.5 (Ónandåßrama edition p. 358): codanety apËrvaµ brËma˙. Cited 
in Biardeau, 1964: 92 n. 1. See further Yoshimizu, 2000: 161 n. 16, on the interpretation of this sentence. 
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Agnihotra etc.’, i.e., with ritual activity.23 A passage in Jayanta Bha††a's Nyåyamañjar¥ 
observes that the old M¥måµsakas identify dharma with apËrva which is without 
substratum (nirådhåra) and is produced by ritual activity, whereas the followers of Íabara 
identify it with ritual activity itself.24 Yoshimizu (2000: 163 n. 27) — drawing attention to a 
passage in the Íåbara Bhå∑ya on sËtra 2.1.1 where dharma and apËrva are identified — 
points out that Íabara, measured by Jayanta's criteria, is an “old M¥måµsaka” rather than a 
“follower of Íabara”. An analysis of Íabara's observations, on the other hand, seems to 
suggest that he may think of apËrva as having a special connection with or even as inhering 
in the human soul.25 
 Halbfass (1991: 302, 334 n. 46), who draws attention to the above-mentioned 
passage of the Nyåyamañjar¥, also refers to some passages in other works where apËrva is 
supposedly a synonym of dharma. Not all these passages do however provide evidence for 
the presumed identification of dharma and apËrva in early M¥måµså. Neither of the two 
passages from Bhart®hari's Våkyapad¥ya which he refers to makes this identification. The 
first one (Vkp 3.7.34) does use the word apËrva, but does not mention dharma; the second 
(Vkp 3.8.37) uses neither of these two terms. The commentator Phullaråja on the first of 
these two verses26 explains that, according to some, apËrva is identical with 
dharma/adharma and with ad®∑†a.27 The identification of dharma/adharma with ad®∑†a 
suggests that Phullaråja does not here introduce us to “an old M¥måµså theory of apËrva”, 
but to the classical Vaiße∑ika doctrine of dharma/adharma, with as added peculiarity that 
now apËrva is said to be the same as the Vaiße∑ika qualities of the soul known by those 
names.  
 Uddyotakara's Nyåya Vårttika on Nyåya-sËtra 1.1.7, too, uses the term apËrva as a 
synonym of dharma and adharma.28 As in the case of Phullaråja, this suggests that we are 
                                                
23 Íabara on M¥måµså-sËtra 1.1.5; Frauwallner, 1968: 24: autpattika˙ ßabdasyårthena saµbandhas tasya 
agnihotrådilak∑aˆasya dharmasya nimittaµ pratyak∑ådibhir anavagatasya. 
24 Jayanta Bha††a, Nyåyamañjar¥ (ed. Íukla I p. 255 l. 3-4; ed. Varadacharya I p. 664 l. 6-7): 
v®ddham¥måµsakå˙ yågådikarmanirvartyam apËrvaµ nåma dharmam abhivadanti, yågådikarmaiva ßåbarå 
bruvate. Further p. 255 l. 8-9 / p. 664 l. 15-16: svargayågåntarålavartinaß ca sthirasya nirådhårasyåpËrvasya 
ni∑pramåˆakatvåt jarajjaimin¥yapravådo 'py apeßala˙. The first of these two positions finds expression in 
Mådhava's Jaimin¥yanyåyamålåvistara (2.1.1: apËrvasyaiva dharmatvåt). Cp. Yoshimizu, 2000: 163 n. 27. 
25 Bronkhorst, 2000a: §13. I am not sure that the passage from Íabara's Bhå∑ya (on sËtra 7.1.7) referred to by 
Yoshimizu (2000: 151) is in contradiction with this idea. 
26 Helåråja's commentary on this and the following stanzas is not available, as indicated by the editor 
Subramania Iyer (1963: 261 n. 31). 
27 Subramania Iyer, 1963: 261 l. 12 (on Vkp 3.7.34): apËrvaµ dharmådharmåkhyam ad®∑†asaµjñakaµ kecid 
evaµrËpaµ taµ såmarthyalak∑aˆaµ bhåvam åhu˙.  
28 NV on 1.1.7, p. 175 l. 2-3: asiddham apËrvasyånityatvam / na pråyaˆånupapatte˙ / yadi dharmådharmau 
nityau bhavata˙ kasya prak∑ayåt pråyaˆam iti / etc. 
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here confronted with a new interpretation of apËrva, which identifies it with the new 
Vaiße∑ika qualities of the soul called dharma and adharma. However, Uddyotakara is 
acquainted with a position which looks upon apËrva, and dharma and adharma, as being 
eternal. This eternal apËrva is supposedly manifested by people:29 “Although apËrva is [one 
and] eternal, [only] the person who makes [it] manifest has [its] fruit. And ritual act is 
[done] for the sake of manifestation. And because it is [done] for manifestation, ritual act is 
not left  unperformed. [For] it is seen that whatever is manifested gives its fruit only to the 
one who manifests it.” Kei Kataoka (2000) has recently argued that the notion of dharma as 
an eternal entity that is made manifest as a result of sacrificial activity was current among 
certain M¥måµsakas, and was at least sometimes identified with apËrva. Such a notion 
appears to be attributed to the M¥måµsakas by authors as diverse as Bhart®hari 
(commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya),30 the author of the V®tti on Bhart®hari's Våkyapad¥ya,31 
SiµhasËri the commentator of Mallavådin's Dvådaßåra-Nayacakra,32 and of course 
Uddyotakara. Also the chapter on M¥måµså in Bhavya's Madhyamakah®daya mentions 
apËrva and describes it as “to be manifested by [ritual] action”.33 His auto-commentary 
Tarkajvålå, moreover, identifies apËrva with dharma.34 Kataoka concludes from all this 
evidence that the theory which he calls dharma-abhivyakti-våda must go back to the latter 
half of the 6th century. 
 It seems, then, that early M¥måµså had rather hazy ideas about the precise nature of 
dharma. Later on, at least in part under the influence of classical Vaiße∑ika, it tried in 
various ways to give a more precise meaning to this originally imprecise term. 
 
                                                
29 NV on 1.1.7, p. 175 l. 9-10: nityam apy apËrvaµ yo 'bhivyanakti tasya phalam, abhivyaktyarthå kriyeti, ato 
na kriyålopa iti / yena yad abhivyajyate tasyaiva tat phaladåt® bhavat¥ti d®∑†am /. Tr. Kataoka, 2000: 170. 
30 Bronkhorst, 1987: 25 l. 24-27: dharmaprayojano vå iti m¥måµsakadarßanam / avasthita eva dharma˙ / sa tv 
agnihotrådibhir abhivyajyate / tatpreritas tu phalado bhavati / yathå svåm¥ bh®tyai˙ sevåyåµ preryate phalaµ 
praty evam ayaµ niyamo dharmasya phalanirv®ttiµ prati prayojaka iti /. Cf. Bronkhorst, 1989: 112 [383] ff.; 
Kataoka, 2000: 168. 
31 Iyer, 1966: 224 l. 5-6 (on verse 1.136 = Vkp 1.172): tatra kecid åcåryå manyante: ... / ßåstrånu∑†hånåt tu 
kevalåd dharmåbhivyakti˙ / ... Kataoka, 2000: 167-168. 
32 DNC I p. 140 l. 25: ... parasparavißi∑†åbhir yajñasaµsthåbhir agni∑†omådibhir i∑†ibhiß cåbhivyaktavyå 
apËrvå api ...; as emended in Kataoka, 2000: 174. DNC I p. 141 l. 8: ... dharma˙ kriyåbhivya∫gya[˙] ... 
Kataoka, 2000: 176. 
33 Bhavya, Madhyamakah®daya 9.10: apËrvo 'pi kriyåvya∫gya˙ kriyå mok∑e 'pi sådhanam / somapånådikå 
vidvån nirjayed antakaµ yayå // “Moreover, apËrva is to be manifested by [ritual] action, and ritual action 
such as drinking soma etc. are the means to [attain] liberation (mok∑a). By means of such [ritual action] a 
knowing person may overcome death.” Cp. Kawasaki, 1977: 10-11; Lindtner, 1997: 96-97; 1999: 254-55; 
2001: 93. 
34 See Kawasaki, 1977: 10 n. 9. 
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We have seen that the ontological concerns of the Vaiße∑ika school of thought made them 
specify what exactly dharma is. In doing so, they ended up with a notion of dharma as a 
quality of the soul, a notion which, as a result of this transformation, had moved a long way 
from the M¥måµså understanding of this term which they started from. M¥måµsakas after 
Íabara were not uninterested in the new qualities dharma and adharma. It appears, indeed, 
that Brahmanical thinkers of the time felt pressed to specify what kind of thing dharma 
really is. Where earlier thinkers of the Vaiße∑ika and M¥måµså schools used the term 
dharma in a rather general sense — expressing something perhaps not too dissimilar to 
English ‘virtue, merit, appropriateness’ —, later thinkers of these two schools felt obliged 
to specify its precise ontological status. In the case of Vaiße∑ika this is not surprising, for 
ontology has been a central concern of this school, perhaps from the beginning; the 
presence of an important element in its philosophy (dharma is mentioned in its first sËtra) 
whose ontological status was less than clear posed a challenge which the school had to 
come to grips with. M¥måµså was perhaps under less pressure; yet it did not escape from 
the ontological concerns of its fellow philosophers. 
 
By way of conclusion some few words can be said about the other classical schools of 
Brahmanical philosophy. Såµkhya — which here includes the so-called Yoga philosophy 
— underwent a strong influence of Vaiße∑ika in matters psychological, but its efforts to 
precisely define what kind of thing dharma was did not lead to noteworthy results. Dharma 
and adharma are explained as parts of buddhi, one of the evolutes of primary matter 
(pradhåna); the constraints of the system hardly allowed for another possibility. The 
Yuktid¥pikå, for example, describes dharma as follows:35 “The disposition which is part of 
[the constituent called] sattva, and which resides in the buddhi as a result of carrying out 
acts that have been prescribed in the Veda and in the sacred tradition, is called dharma.” 
The so-called Vedånta philosophy presents itself as a better form of M¥måµså, but one 
which, unlike ritual M¥måµså, does not study dharma but Brahma. Brahma-sËtra 1.1.1 
reads athåto brahmajijñåså, which is an adaptation of M¥måµså-sËtra 1.1.1 athåto 
dharmajijñåså. The Íår¥raka M¥måµså — later also called Uttara-M¥måµså — builds in an 
essential way on ritual M¥måµså, to which it has left the study of dharma; it can now 
concentrate on Brahma. Dharma does not therefore play as crucial a role in it. 
 
 
                                                
35 YD p. 191 l. 33-35: tatra ßrutism®tivihitånåµ karmaˆåm anu∑†hånåd buddhyavastha˙ sattvåvayava 
åßayabhËto dharma ity ucyate. Cp. Bronkhorst, 2000a: 56. 
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Appendix: 
 
The following passage occurs, as we have seen, in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha: 
 
(1) dravyaguˆakarmasåmånyaviße∑asamavåyånåµ ∑aˆˆåµ padårthånåµ 
sådharmyavaidharmyåbhyåµ tattvajñånaµ ni˙ßreyasahetu˙ / tac 
ceßvaracodanåbhivyaktåd dharmåd eva / (WI p. 1 § 2) 
 
It is not possible to seriously discuss this passage without taking into consideration passage 
(2), which is a sËtra in one of the surviving versions of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra: 
 
(2) dharmaviße∑aprasËtåd dravyaguˆakarmasåmånyaviße∑asamavåyånåµ padårthånåµ 
sådharmyavaidharmyåbhyåµ tattvajñånån ni˙ßreyasam (VS(Í) 1.1.4) 
 
This is sËtra 1.1.4 in the version of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra commented upon by Ía∫kara Mißra. 
It does not occur in the other surviving versions of this text.36 We will refer to it as “the 
fourth sËtra”. 
 The similarity between (1) and (2) is undeniable, and we have to accept that the two 
did not come into existence independently of each other. The question is: Which one 
influenced, and therefore preceded, the other? 
 Erich Frauwallner (1984: 39) argued that “the fourth sËtra” (2) was composed under 
the influence of Padårthadharmasa∫graha passage (1). He further argued that “the fourth 
sËtra” (2) is indispensible after the three sËtras that precede it, and must therefore be 
accepted as belonging in their company, in spite of the fact that it has only been preserved 
in the version commented upon by Ía∫kara Mißra. These four initial sËtras, Frauwallner 
argued, must have been composed after the original character of Vaiße∑ika had been 
modified around the time of Praßasta. The original beginning of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra was 
different, and Frauwallner makes an attempt to reconstruct it. 
 Frauwallner's arguments that original Vaiße∑ika was not interested in concepts like 
liberation and that such ideas, along with the idea of a creator God, did not enter the system 
until around the time of Praßasta, have found little favour among more recent scholars. 
Halbfass (1986; 1992: 69 f.) has described Frauwallner's thesis about the “original 
beginning” of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra as “challenging, but not convincing”. Houben (1994) 
                                                
36 The Trivandrum manuscript edited by Isaacson (1995: 270; 1995a: 757) has sådhanåny asya 
dravyaguˆakarmåˆi. 
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criticizes Frauwallner's position according to which originally Vaiße∑ika was a pure 
philosophy of nature without interest in liberation. This implies that the beginning of the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra may have been as it is today, already before the time of Praßasta. 
 This raises the question whether “the fourth sËtra” may be older than Praßasta. This 
question is to be distinguished from the other one as to whether “the fourth sËtra” is 
inseparable from the three initial sËtras of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. If it is inseparable from 
those three, the “fourth sËtra” must be as old as the other ones, and therefore older than 
Praßasta. But it may conceivably be older than Praßasta without being inseparable from the 
three initial sËtras. It may conceivably have existed as part of a commentary, or as a sËtra 
that was added long after the first three but still before Praßasta. The question as to how old 
the “fourth sËtra” is must therefore be considered on its own, independently of speculations 
about its connection with other sËtras. 
 Isaacson (1995: 234) is of the opinion that “... there is no good reason to regard the 
sËtra as old”. In another publication (1995a: 757 n. 22) he criticizes Frauwallner: 
“Frauwallner's keen philological instinct may perhaps have erred ... It is precisely the 
absence of the expected enumeration of categories which is likely to be original here. 
Indeed an enumeration of six categories would be suspect, for I think it very likely that in 
the earliest period of composition of sËtras the classical list of padårthas had not yet been 
settled on.” This last argument may be valid, and would show that the “fourth sËtra” cannot 
have belonged to the earliest period of composition of sËtras. This does not however help 
us all that much, for passages that existed before Praßasta do not for that reason necessarily 
belong to the earliest period of Vaiße∑ika. There is indeed some reason to think that 
Praßasta, if he knew passage (2) at all, did not recognize it as a sËtra, this because Praßasta 
normally clearly indicates that he considers something a sËtra.37 He might then have cited it 
to justify (1). This does not exclude the possibility that (2) had once been a sËtra that, 
because of its length, came to be looked upon as part of a commentary.38 We here find 
ourselves in the midst of speculations from among which the available evidence does not 
allow us to make a sensible choice. 
 Let us look somewhat more closely at passages (1) and (2). Both agree that 
knowledge of the essence of the Vaiße∑ika categories is the cause of the highest good. Both 
agree that this knowledge results from dharma. According to the Padårthadharmasa∫graha 
                                                
37 Bronkhorst, 1993a: 83 f.  
38 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1993: 164 f. 
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this dharma is “manifested by the injunctions of the Lord” (Jha, 1915/1982: 16). The 
“fourth sËtra” (2) merely states that this dharma is special (dharmaviße∑a). 
 An important difference between the two passages is that the former recognizes a 
creator God where the latter does not. It is known that the notion of a creator God entered 
Vaiße∑ika rather late (Bronkhorst, 1996). However, if one accepts the obvious, viz., that 
passages (1) and (2) are not independent of each other, it will be difficult to conclude from 
this that the “fourth sËtra” (2) was composed under the influence of passage (1). As far as 
our knowledge of the development of Vaiße∑ika goes, the idea of a creator God was 
accepted by all subsequent texts of the school, certainly by all those that based themselves 
on the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. It is hard to believe that the author of the “fourth sËtra” — 
assuming that he composed this sËtra under the influence of the Padårthadharmasa∫graha 
— could leave out God and simply speak of a special dharma (dharmaviße∑a). Influence in 
the opposite direction — the passage in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha was composed under 
the influence of the “fourth sËtra” (2) — avoids this difficulty. 
 This position is confronted with one difficulty. We had occasion to observe that the 
word dharma in passage (1) is closer to M¥måµså and early Vaiße∑ika usage than to the 
classical Vaiße∑ika use of this term. The “fourth sËtra” (2), on the other hand, would seem 
to use the term in a way which agrees with classical Vaiße∑ika. The compound 
dharmaviße∑a occurs several times in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha,39 but does not appear to 
be used in M¥måµså.40 Is this proof that the “fourth sËtra” must be more recent than 
passage (1)? 
 It is not. We saw that passage (1) uses the word dharma archaically and is therefore 
something of an anachronism in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. We concluded from it that 
the classical meaning of dharma may have been introduced into Vaiße∑ika before Praßasta. 
The classical use of dharma in the “fourth sËtra” does not therefore prove anything 
regarding its age. 
 If, then, we are forced to choose between these two possibilities: either the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha passage (1) influenced the “fourth sËtra” (2), or vice-versa, we 
may have to consider the second possibility as the more likely. The “fourth sËtra” may be 
older than the Padårthadharmasa∫graha, and Praßasta may have known it, even if not as a 
sËtra. It is true that we may not be forced to make such a choice. The similarity between 
these two passages might be due to the fact that both were influenced by an earlier common 
                                                
39 WI p. 131, s.v. dharma-viße∑åt, dharma-viße∑a-sahitebhya˙. 
40 Cp. M¥måµsåko∑a IV pp. 2241 s.v. dharma etc. 
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source. Either way, it seems unlikely that the “fourth sËtra” was composed under the 
influence of passage (1). 
 
 
References: 
 
Biardeau, Madeleine (1964): Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le 
brahmanisme classique. Paris - La Haye: Mouton. (Le monde d'outre-mer, passé et 
présent, première série, études XXIII.) 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (ed., tr.)(1987): Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå of Bhart®hari. Fascicule IV: 
Óhnika 1. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. (Post-Graduate and 
Research Department Series, 28.) 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1989): “Studies on Bhart®hari, 2: Bhart®hari and M¥måµså.” Studien 
zur Indologie und Iranistik 15 (1989), 101-117. (Reprinted in: Studies in M¥måµså. 
Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume. Ed. R.C. Dwivedi. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 1994. Pp. 371-388.) 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993): “The Vaiße∑ika våkya and bhå∑ya.” Annals of the Bhandarkar 
Oriental Research Institute 72-73 [for the years 1991 and 1992 (Am®tamahotsava 
(1917-1992) Volume)], 1993, pp. 145-169. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993a): “Studies on Bhart®hari, 5: Bhart®hari and Vaiße∑ika.” 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhart®hari (University of 
Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 47 (1), 1993, 75-
94. (Reprinted in: Bhart®hari, Philosopher and Grammarian. Proceedings of the First 
International Conference on Bhart®hari (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). 
Ed. Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1994. Pp. 
75-94.) 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1994): “Once again Vaiße∑ika sËtra 3.1.13.” Asiatische Studien / 
Études Asiatiques 48(2), 665-681. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996): “God's arrival in the Vaiße∑ika system.” Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 24(3), 281-294. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2000): “Die buddhistische Lehre.” Der Buddhismus I. Der indische 
Buddhismus und seine Verzweigungen. Von Heinz Bechert et al. Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer. (Die Religionen der Menschheit, vol. 24,1.) Pp. 23-212. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2000a): Karma and Teleology. A problem and its solutions in Indian 
philosophy. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, International 
College for Advanced Buddhist Studies. (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph 
Series, 15.) 
Frauwallner, Erich (1963/1995): “Pañcaskandhaka and Pañcavastuka.” = Frauwallner, 
1995: 135-147. 
Frauwallner, Erich (1968): Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmam¥måµså. 
Wien: Hermann Böhlaus. (ÖAW, philosophisch-historische Klasse, 
Sitzungsberichte, 259. Bd., 2. Abhandlung; Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für 
Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 6.) 
Frauwallner, Erich (1984): Nachgelassene Werke. I: Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen. Ed. Ernst 
Steinkellner. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 
(ÖAW, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sizungsberichte, 438. Bd.; 
Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 
19.) 
SOME USES OF DHARMA  16 
 
 
Frauwallner, Erich (1995): Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist 
Philosophical Systems. Translated from the German by Sophie Francis Kidd, under 
the supervision of Ernst Steinkellner. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Halbfass, Wilhelm (1986): Review of Frauwallner, 1984. Journal of the Amerian Oriental 
Society 106, 857-858. 
Halbfass, Wilhelm (1991): Tradition and Reflection. Explorations in Indian thought. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Halbfass, Wilhelm (1992): On Being and What There Is. Classical Vaiße∑ika and the 
history of Indian ontology. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Houben, Jan E. M. (1994): “Liberation and natural philosophy in early Vaiße∑ika: some 
methodological problems.” Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 48(2), 711-748. 
Isaacson, Harunaga (1995): Materials for the Study of the Vaiße∑ika System. Unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Leiden University. 
Isaacson, Harunaga (1995a): “Notes on the manuscripts transmission of the Vaiße∑ikasËtra 
and its earliest commentaries.” Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 48(2), 749-
779. 
Iyer, K. A. Subramania (ed.)(1966): Våkyapad¥ya of Bhart®hari, with the V®tti and the 
Paddhati of V®∑abhadeva. Kåˆ∂a I. Poona: Deccan College. (Deccan College 
Monograph Series, 32.) 
Jayanta Bha††a: Nyåyamañjar¥. 1) Edited with notes by Pt. Surya Nåråyana Íukla. Part I. 
Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office. 1971. (Kashi Sanskrit Series, 106; 
Nyåya Section No. 15.) 2) Edited, with Èippaˆ¥-Nyåyasaurabha by the editor, by K. 
S. Varadacharya. Vol. I. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute. (Oriental Research 
Institute Series, 116.) 
Jha, Ga∫gånåtha (tr.)(1915/1982): Padårthadharmasa∫graha of Praßastapåda, with the 
Nyåyakandal¥ of Ír¥dhara, translated into English. Reprint: Chaukhambha 
Orientalia, Varanasi - Delhi, 1982 (Chaukhambha Oriental Studies, 4.) 
Kapani, Lakshmi (1992-1993): La notion de saµskåra. 2 vols. Paris: Diffusion de Boccard. 
(Collège de France, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, fascicule 59.) 
Kataoka, Kei (2000): “Reconstructing the dharma-abhivyakti-våda in the M¥måµså 
tradition.” The Way to Liberation. Indological Studies in Japan. Volume I. Ed. 
Sengaku Mayeda. New Delhi: Manohar. 2000. (Japanese Studies on South Asia No. 
3.) Pp. 167-181. 
Kawasaki, ShinjØ (1977): “The M¥måµså chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-h®daya-kårikå: 
text and translation. (1) PËrva-pak∑a.” Institute of Philosophy, The University of 
Tsukuba, Studies 1976, pp. 1-16. 
Kritzer, Robert (2002): “Unthinkable matters: the term acintya in the 
Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya.” Early Buddhism and Abhidharma Thought: In Honor of 
Doctor Hajime Sakurabe on His Seventy-seventh Birthday. Kyoto: Heirakuji 
Shoten. Pp. 65-86. 
Lindtner, Christian (1997): "Bhavya on M¥måµså." Studia Indologiczne (Oriental Institute, 
Warsaw University) 4 (Aspects of Buddhism, Proceedings of the International Seminar on 
Buddhist Studies, Liw, 25 June 1994), 91-123. 
Lindtner, Christian (1999): “Bhavya on M¥måµså. M¥måµsåtattvanirˆayåvatåra˙, with 
English translation.” Adyar Library Bulletin 1999, 245-302. 
Lindtner, Christian (ed.)(2001): Madhyamakah®dayam of Bhavya. Adyar, Chennai: The 
Adyar Library and Research Centre, The Theosophical Society. 
Ía∫kara Mißra: Upaskåra (commentary on the Vaiße∑ika SËtra). In: Vaiße∑ikadarßane 
mahar∑ipravara-Praßastadevåcåryaviracitaµ Praßastapådabhå∑yam, 
vidvaccË∂åmaˆi-ßr¥-Ía∫kara-Mißra-vinirmita˙ Upaskåraß ca. Ed. flhuˆ∂iråja Íåstr¥. 
Kåß¥: Caukhambåsaµsk®tapustakålaya. (Kåß¥ Sanskrit Series, 3.) 
SOME USES OF DHARMA  17 
 
 
Sinha, Nandalal (tr.)(1911/1986): The Vaiße∑ika SËtras of Kaˆåda, with the commentary of 
Ía∫kara Mißra. Reprint: S. N. Publications, Delhi, 1986. 
Subramania Iyer, K. A. (ed.)(1963): Våkyapad¥ya of Bhart®hari with the commentary of 
Helåråja. Kåˆ∂a III, Part 1. Poona: Deccan College. (Deccan College Monograph 
Series, 21.) 
Thakur, Anantalal (ed.)(1957): Vaiße∑ikadarßana of Kaˆåda, with an anonymous 
commentary. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in 
Sanskrit Learning. 
Thakur, Anantalal (1961): “Introduction.” See VS(C). 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra. 1) Edited, with the commentary of Candrånanda, by Muni Jambuvijaya. 
Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1961. (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, 136.) 2a) Edited, with 
an anonymous commentary, by Anantalal Thakur. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute. 
1957. 2b) Edited, with the commentary of Bha††a Våd¥ndra, by Anantalal Thakur. 
Darbhanga: Kåmeßvarasiµha-Darabha∫gå-Saµsk®ta-Vißvavidyålaya. 1985. 
3) Edited, with a translation of the sËtras, of the commentary of Ía∫kara Mißra and 
of extracts from the gloss of Jayanåråyaˆa, by Nandalal Sinha. Delhi: 
S.N. Publications. 1986. The three numbers that specify a sËtra refer to these three 
editions respectively. Where only one number is given, the reference is to the first 
of these three. 
Wijeratne, R. P., and Gethin, Rupert (tr.)(2002): Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma 
(Abhidhammatthasa∫gaha) by Anuruddha - Exposition of the Topics of 
Abhidhamma (Abhidhammatthavibhåvin¥) by Suma∫gala, being a commentary to 
Anuruddha's Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma. Oxford: Pali Text Society. 
(Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 50.) 
Yoshimizu, Kiyotaka (2000): “Change of view on apËrva from Íabarasvåmin to Kumårila.” 
The Way to Liberation. Indological Studies in Japan. Volume I. Ed. Sengaku 
Mayeda. New Delhi: Manohar. 2000. (Japanese Studies on South Asia No. 3.) Pp. 
149-165. 
 
 
Abbreviations: 
 
DNC Dvådaßåra Nayacakra of Mallavådin. Edited, with the commentary 
Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥ of SiµhasËri Gaˆi Vådi K∑amåßramaˆa, by Muni 
JambËvijayaj¥, 3 parts, Bhavnagar: Sri Jain Atmanand Sabha, 1966, 1976, 
1988. 
GOS Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda 
NV Nyåya Vårttika de Uddyotakara, in the following edition: Nyåyadarßanam 
with Våtsyåyana's Bhå∑ya, Uddyotakara's Vårttika, Våcaspati Mißra's 
Tåtparya†¥kå & Vißvanåtha's V®tti. Chapter I, section I critically edited with 
notes by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and chapters I-ii—V by 
Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, with an introduction by Narendra Chandra 
Vedantatirtha. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House, 1936.  
ÖAW Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 
Vkp Bhart®hari, Våkyapad¥ya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977 
VS Vaiße∑ika SËtra 
VS(C) Vaiße∑ikasËtra of Kaˆåda, with the Commentary of Candrånanda, critically 
edited by Muni Ír¥ Jambuvijayaji, second edition, Baroda: Oriental Research 
Institute, 1982 (GOS 136) 
VS(Í) Vaiße∑ika SËtra in the version commented upon by Ía∫kara Mißra; for an 
edition see Sinha, 1911/1986. 
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WI Word Index to the Praßastapådabhå∑ya: A complete word index to the 
printed editions of the Praßastapådabhå∑ya, by Johannes Bronkhorst & Yves 
Ramseier, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994 
YD Yuktid¥pikå, ed. in Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi, Yuktid¥pikå: The 
most significant commentary on the Såµkhyakårikå, Vol. I, Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner, 1998 (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, 44) 
 
 
